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PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Volume 13 Fall 1995 Number 1
The Climate Change Convention and
Evolving Legal Models of Sustainable
Development
DAVID HODAS*
The tension between expanding economic production and
maintaining environmental amenities has always defined so-
ciety's love/hate relationship with environmental law. A gen-
eration ago moral outrage over burning rivers, polluted air
and species extinction led to the enactment of stringent do-
mestic environmental laws that sought to protect public
health and the environment with little or no regard for the
cost of compliance.' Today, the pendulum has swung to the
point where vocal property rights advocates propose disman-
tling environmental statutes that protect endangered species
* Associate Professor, Widener University School of Law; LL.M. in Envi-
ronmental Law (Feldshuh Fellow) 1989, Pace University School of Law; J.D.,
cum laude, 1976, Boston University School of Law; B.A., cum laude, 1973, Wil-
liams College. This article would not have been possible without the assistance
of the astute insights and probing questions of Judy Oken Hodas.
1. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1) (1984). "Na-
tional primary ambient air quality standards ... shall, .. . allowing an ade-
quate margin of safety, [be] requisite to the public health." Id. EPA v. Nat'l
Crushed Stone Assoc., 449 U.S. 64 (1980) (holding that under the Clean Water
Act, effluent limitation could be valid even if the cost of compliance might push
some firms into bankruptcy); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)
(holding that under the Endangered Species Act, the value of endangered spe-
cies is "incalculable," and therefore courts are prohibited from balancing the
utility of an endangered species against the economic loss from enjoining a fed-
eral project that jeopardizes the continued existence of the species, even if the
project is a nearly completed hydroelectric dam).
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and wetland ecosystems, 2 and impairing the government's
ability to regulate under existing environmental laws. Yet,
despite the pro-development complaints of the business com-
munity about the allegedly stifling costs of environmental
compliance, over the last two decades our country has en-
joyed remarkable economic development. Nevertheless, in
the United States, the history of major environmental laws
and regulations has been an account of industry challenges to
proposals for enhanced protection. Those challenges have
been consistently founded on the untrue but persistent as-
sumption that environmental protection must be inversely
proportional to economic output;3 i.e., jobs versus the en-
vironment. The response from environmentalists is that en-
vironmental and economic goals need not be mutually
exclusive. They argue that sustainable development must ac-
commodate human economic needs and environmental pro-
tection, because assuming our environmental laws were
complied with, this increasing economic activity, coupled
with steady population growth,4 breeds widespread ecosys-
2. See David Helvarg, The War Against the Greens (1994).
3. ROBERT PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE
AND POLICY 165 (1992).
Experience with environmental regulation has demonstrated that
industry estimates of prospective compliance costs prove to be far
too pessimistic. EPA Assistant Administrator William G. Rosen-
berg notes: 'Historically, actual costs are generally much lower
than projections because of improved technology. For example, in
1971 the oil industry estimated that lead phase-out would cost...
$7 billion a year. In 1990, with 99% of the lead phase-out accom-
plished, actual costs are only $150 million to $500 million a year,
95% less than earlier estimates.'
Id. at 167. See also W. Rosenberg, Clean Air Amendments, 251 SCIENCE 1546,
1547 (1991).
4. As our population and economic activities grow, environmental rules
must become more comprehensive merely to maintain existing ecological and
public health conditions, let alone improve deteriorating air, watersheds and
ecosystems. For example, statistics for New York City show how population
growth affects pollutant load. From 1880 to 1980, the metropolitan region's
population grew by a factor of five, from roughly 3 million to 15.2 million people.
Estimated waterborne discharges of organic carbon, nitrogen and phosphorous
from human waste rose in direct proportion to population growth. WORLD RE-
SOURCES INSTITUTE, World Resources 1994-95, 34 (1994). The United States
population, currently slightly over 250,000,000 persons, grows annually at the
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/4
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tern deterioration even in the United States,5 which has one
of the world's most advanced environmental law systems.
First conceived in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, sus-
tainable development has been the clarion for many as the
answer to the jobs versus environment dilemma. Twenty
years later, Agenda 216 and the Rio Declaration 7 of the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment tried to place the concept of sustainable development at
the center of international policy so that in the coming de-
cades, economic development would proceed in a fashion com-
patible with environmental protection. Many argue,
however, that sustainable development is too "slippery" a
concept to have meaning,8 and therefore has been a failure. 9
For instance, the construction of a factory in a developing
country could be deemed a sustainable development project
because it would provide jobs that improve economic well-be-
ing, despite the absence of pollution controls which allows the
factory to pollute both air and water with toxic waste. Argua-
bly, the present value of the jobs outweighs the potential of
future health and environmental concerns from the contami-
nation (at least in the minds of the newly hired workers, who
rate of 1.03%, which means each year the needs of approximately 2,600,000
additional people must be met. Id. at 269.
5. For instance, the longleaf pine, once the dominant vegetation in the
southeast United States, has declined by 98% since the time of the first colonial
settlers. William K Stevens, Latest Endangered Species: Natural Habitats of
America, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 14, 1995, at Al, C4.
6. Adopted by the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) at Rio de Janeiro, June 13, 1992, I, II, I1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26
(1992). See generally THE COMM'N ON ENVTL. LAW OF THE WORLD CONSERVA-
TION UNION & THE INT'L UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATU-
RAL RESOURCES, AGENDA 21 AND THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS (Nicholas A.
Robinson et al. eds., 1992) for a comprehensive review of the draft and final
Agenda 21 and how they fit into the UNCED proceedings.
7. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Adopted by the U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) at Rio de Janeiro,
June 13, 1992, I U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
8. See, e.g., Helen Endre-Stacy, Sustaining ESD in Australia, 69 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 935 (1994); Christopher D. Stone, Deciphering Sustainable Devel-
opment, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977 (1994).
9. See, e.g., Rebecca A. Hoelting, Note, After Rio: The Sustainable Devel-
opment Concept Following the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 117 (1994).
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would most likely apply a relatively high discount rate to the
value of future damages), and this extra present value could
be invested to improve the country's future.
Others assert that the focus in Rio on the Climate
Change Convention' ° and the Biodiversity Treaty1 detracted
from more important sustainable development issues, such
as indoor air pollution in rural Africa, clean drinking water
and sanitation in developing nations.12
I propose the contrary is true. Without these treaties,
and perhaps others,' 3 sustainable development will become a
catch phrase justifying any development project, no matter
what the environmental consequences. To understand how
these two treaties can give "sustainable development" mean-
ing, we must first trace the evolution of sustainable develop-
ment in more detail, then consider its critics and the treaties'
critics to see whether sustainable development can have legal
meaning.
In 1972, the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment (Stockholm),
having considered the need for a common outlook and for
common principles to inspire and guide the peoples of the
world in the preservation and enhancement of the human
environment, [proclaimed the] imperative goal [for human-
kind] to defend and improve the human environment for
present and future generations... in harmony with... the
10. Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26, reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
849 (1992).
11. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec.
29, 1993).
12. See, e.g., Gregg Easterbrook, Forget PCB's, Radon, Alar, The World's
Greatest Environmental Dangers are Dung Smoke and Dirty Water, N.Y. TnMEs
MAG., Sept. 11, 1994, at 60 [hereinafter Easterbrook].
13. See, e.g., United Nations Environment Programme Conference of Pleni-
potentiaries on the Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes; Final Act and Text of Basel Convention, Mar. 22,
1989, 28 I.L.M. 649, 657 (entered into force May 5, 1992).
[Vol. 13
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established and fundamental goals of peace and worldwide
economic and social development. 14
The conference declared, as a matter of "common conviction,"
that "man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality
and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a qual-
ity that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears
a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environ-
ment for present and future generations."' 5 The conference
continued by declaring the now famous Principle 21:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sover-
eign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental policies, and the responsibility to en-
sure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other states or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.' 6
However, Principles 1 and 21, not implemented by any
enforceable international legal regime, did not solve the envi-
ronmental and human development problems the Stockholm
Conference faced in 1972. A decade later, the United Nations
(UN), fearing that degradation of the world's ecosystems
would lead to "the breakdown of the economic, social and
political framework of civilization,"' 7 proposed that all eco-
systems and resources of the world used by humans "be man-
aged to achieve and maintain optimum sustainable
productivity,"' 8 that "planning and implementation of social
and economic development activities [take] due account" of
the "conservation of nature,"' 9 and that, "taking fully into ac-
count the sovereignty of States over their natural resources,
14. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.48/14(Rev. at 1-3, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
15. Id. Principle 1.
16. Id. Principle 21 (emphasis added).
17. World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/37/51 (1982), reprinted 22 I.L.M. 455 (1983).
18. Id. 4.
19. Id. 7.
5
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each State shall give effect to the provisions of the [World
Charter for Nature]." 20 Unfortunately, the Stockholm Decla-
ration and the World Charter for Nature did nothing more
than elevate the notion of sustainable development to a pro-
posed world "ethic" that urges nations to simultaneously pur-
sue the perceived competing moral principles of economic/
social justice and environmental responsibility. 21 In re-
sponse, after much discussion, the UN created the World
Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland
Commission) in the fall of 1983 to flesh out the factual and
policy issues that comprise the abstraction of sustainable
development. 22
The Brundtland Commission's mandate was monumen-
tal: a) re-examine the critical issues of environment and de-
velopment and formulate innovative, concrete and realistic
action proposals to deal with them; b) strengthen existing
and propose new forms of international cooperation on envi-
ronment and development; and c) raise world-wide levels of
understanding and commitment to action.23 Finally, after
years of work by thousands of people, and public hearings
around the globe, 24 the Commission issued its 1987 report,
OuR COMMON FuTURE, which predicted "ever increasing envi-
ronmental decay, poverty and hardship in an ever more pol-
luted world" with decreasing resources 25 unless the world
moves to achieve a "new era of economic growth... based on
policies that sustain and expand the environmental resource
base."26
20. Id. 22.
21. See J. Ronald Engel, Introduction to ETHICS OF ENVIRONMENT AND DE-
VELOPMENT 1, 2 (J. Ronald Engel and Joan Gibb Engel eds., 1990).
22. Process of Preparation of the Environmental Prospective to the Year
2000 and Beyond, GA. Res.38/161, U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 38th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A]38/702/ADD.7 (1983).
23. THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR
COMMON FUTURE 363 (1987) [hereinafter OuR COMMON FUTURE].
24. Id. at 359-87.
25. Id. at 1.
26. Id.
[Vol. 13
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According to OUR COMMON FUTURE, the world must
simultaneously grapple with four related crises:27 1) rapid
population growth which will increase existing impoverish-
ment-90% of the growth will be in the poorest countries,
and 90% of that growth in already overburdened cities; 2) eco-
nomic growth, which consumes natural resources, creates
pollution burdens, and, because of international economic re-
lationships, creates enormous pressure to minimize environ-
mental management in developing countries; 3) ecological
problems arising from soil erosion, water pollution and avail-
ability, atmospheric pollution and climate modifications, and
deforestation and biodiversity diminishment; and 4) the bor-
rowing of environmental capital from future generations with
no intention or prospect of repayment. Sustainable develop-
ment (the process of meeting the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
needs)28 was proposed as the conceptual framework to ad-
dress these competing elements of population growth, eco-
nomic growth and environmental quality. Although OUR
COMMON FUTURE moved sustainable development from an
ethical idea to a conceptual framework for policy analysis, it
could not go beyond identifying categories of concern: inter-
national economic relationships and institutions; manage-
ment of the global commons; attainment of peace and
security; the international adoption of legal structures that
deal with environmental effects; and institutions that enforce
environmental obligations together with mechanisms for in-
vesting in our future.29 These all need to be created, adopted
and implemented to make sustainable development a reality.
Recognizing that the concept of sustainable development
was appealing, yet meaningless, the UN scheduled an inter-
national conference for 1992, twenty years after Stockholm,
for the purpose of giving sustainable development concrete
27. OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 23, at 8.
28. Id. at 8.
29. Id. at 308-47; see also R.D. Munro & J.G. Lammers, EXPERTS GROUP ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVEL-
OPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1987).
7
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meaning. Known as UNCED, the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development met in June 1992 in Brazil
to declare how Stockholm's principles might be translated
into international law.30 More particularly, UNCED was con-
vened to "elaborate strategies and measures to halt and re-
verse the effects of environmental degradation" and "to
promote sustainable and environmentally sound develop-
ment"3 1 by, inter alia, promoting the "development of interna-
tional law."3 2
UNCED's initial agenda was enormous, covering almost
all the world's major environmental problems and almost all
facets of the human condition:
a) protection of the atmosphere by combatting climate
change, depletion of the ozone layer and transboundary air
pollution;
b) protection of the quality and supply of freshwater
resources;
c) protection of the oceans and seas, including enclosed
and semi-enclosed seas, and of coastal areas and the pro-
tection, rational use and development of their living
resources;
d) protection and management of land resources by, inter
alia, combatting deforestation, desertification and drought;
e) conservation of biological diversity;
f0 environmentally sound management of biotechnology;
g) environmentally sound management of wastes; particu-
larly hazardous wastes, and toxic chemicals, as well as pro-
tection from illegal international traffic in toxic and
dangerous products and wastes;
h) improvement of the living and working environment of
the poor in urban slums and rural areas through eradicat-
ing poverty, inter alia, as well as taking other appropriate
measures at all levels necessary to stem the degradation of
the environment; and
30. See Thacher, Background to Institutional Option for Management of the
Global Environment and Commons, at 54, 77 (1991) (unpublished paper for the
World Federation of United Nations Association's Project on "Global Security
and Risk Management").
31. G.A. Res. 44/228, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., Agenda Item 82(f) 1.3 (1990).
32. Id. 1.15(d).
[Vol. 13
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i) protection of human health condition and improvement
of the quality of life.33
Not unexpectedly, the focus of the conference was, of ne-
cessity, much narrower. But even with this narrowing, UN-
CED was remarkably ambitious in seeking to produce six
categories of outcomes:3 4
1) a mutually agreeable statement of environmental and
developmental principles governing the conduct of nations
and people to be called the "Earth Charter;"3 5
2) a programme of work (Agenda 21) addressing major en-
vironmental and developmental priorities into the 21st
century;
3) an agreement concerning financial resources for imple-
menting the programme;
4) an agreement on access to environmentally sound tech-
nologies for developing countries;
5) an agreement on measures to strengthen and supple-
ment existing international institutions and institutional
processing; and
6) legal instruments on climate change and biodiversity.
Thus, the problem facing UNCED and the world was,
and remains, how to link environmental values with eco-
nomic development. While it may be possible to achieve
framework agreements on climate change and biodiversity is-
sues, which might even include specific greenhouse gas emis-
sion reduction targets, the more fundamental question of how
law can link environmental values with economic develop-
ment must inevitably be addressed. When international
agreements address problems on an ad hoc basis, they create
a patchwork of legal solutions that is merely reactive to envi-
33. Id. 12.
34. See Report of Maurice F. Strong, Sec. Gen. of the Conference, to the
Second Session of the UNCED Preparatory Committee, A/CONF.151/PC/14,
49-58.
35. The document that was ultimately issued was called the Rio Declara-
tion and its language was the subject of heated debate. For a detailed analysis
of the tensions reflected in the Declaration, see David A. Wirth, The Rio Decla-
ration on Environment and Development: Two Steps Forward and One Step
Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REV. 599 (1995).
9
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ronmental crises. Although economic concerns are always a
variable in these agreements, international law has not cre-
ated a systematic framework within which environmentally
sound sustainable development decisions can be made in the
daily activity of the world. This paper suggests that the con-
ceptual approaches to environmental law and international
law do not lead to a workable international law of sustainable
development.
Instead, the law must be reformulated to reflect the laws
of ecology, biology, physics and chemistry on one hand, and
economic principles on the other. The declaratory principles
that each state has a sovereign right to exploit resources and
act within its borders, yet must be responsible for effects
caused outside its borders set forth the model the law must
implement. The economics side of the balance is already fully
implemented in international law in the doctrine of sover-
eignty, which allows each state to maximize its own welfare
as an actor in the world's markets. However, as to each coun-
try's daily activities, current law lacks any comprehensive
means to account for the effects on others created by activi-
ties within a state's borders. An international law of sustain-
able development must provide a framework that balances
the privilege of sovereign action with the responsibility for
that action. To do this, the law must internalize adverse en-
vironmental effects into economic development decisions.
For instance, the earth's atmosphere is a global commons
into which the world's population emits the gaseous by-prod-
ucts of its activities on the erroneous assumption that the at-
mosphere has limitless capacity to absorb invisible gaseous
wastes without changing its characteristics, and that air-pol-
lution is cost-free waste disposal. However, these emissions
affect changes in the world's ecosystems, and some of the
emissions may radically alter the world's climate. 36 The
same is true of local and regional air pollution, water pollu-
tion, hazardous waste disposal, national resource utilization,
forestry practices, the preservation of species diversity and
36. Second Assessment Report, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, Adopted at Rome, Dec. 12, 1995.
[Vol. 13
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the capacity of the world's ecosystems to supplement life.
Theoretically, if the environmental cost of the use or con-
sumption of each resource were included in its price, then the
market would encourage resource use that increased the effi-
cient use of each resource and reduced total environmental
costs, resulting in lower costs of each activity to society. 37 Be-
cause the market inherently fails to internalize these costs
into private decision-making, the legal system must fill the
gap so that decisions about local actions reflect global or re-
gional effects. Presently, the cost of emissions and ecosystem
consequences are not at all included in decisions.38 To
achieve sustainable development, the failure of the market to
externalize environmental costs must be corrected. This is
the task for the law, which can modify conduct and mold in-
stitutions. It is also the vehicle society uses to require exter-
nal costs to be internalized.
The balance of this article will explore whether the UN-
CED process, and its results - the Rio Declaration, Agenda
21, the Climate Change Convention and the Biodiversity
Convention - advanced or set back the cause of sustainable
development in international law. The analysis begins with
Gregg Easterbrook's provocative argument that it was a mis-
take for the world to devote time at UNCED to finalizing the
Climate Change Convention and the Biodiversity Convention
instead of devoting the world's attention to improving drink-
ing water, sewage treatment, and air quality in the poor, un-
derdeveloped countries of the world.3 9 Specifically, he was
highly critical of public interest environmental organizations,
37. See RICHARD L. OTTINGER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF ELECTRic-
rY 127, 137 (1990).
38. "A decision not to consider external costs in itself quantifies them by
setting their value at zero." F. Paul Bland, Problems of Price and Transporta-
tion: Two Proposals to Encourage Competition from Alternative Energy Re-
sources, 10 HARv. ENV TL. L. REV. 345, 386 (1986). The question of how a
particular environmental damage should be valued and what that value should
be is beyond the scope of this article. However, considerable energy is going
into answering this question. RICHARD L. OTrINGER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
COSTS OF ELECTRICITY (1990); ExTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF ELECTRIC
POWER (Olav Hohmeyer & Richard L. Ottinger eds., 1994); and SOCIAL COSTS OF
ENERGY (Olav Hohmeyer & Richard L. Ottinger eds., 1991).
39. Easterbrook, supra note 12.
11
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which he disparingly refers to as "enviros,"40 for selecting
global climate change and biodiversity as the central issues to
be addressed at UNCED, instead of pressing public health is-
sues such as drinking water and urban air pollution.41 Thus,
the idea of sustainable development must now not only re-
solve the tensions between the cost of environmental protec-
tion and economic development, but also grapple with
perceived tensions of choosing among important goals: public
health needs versus ecological health.
However, UNCED was to link ecological concerns with
human development needs, not separate them. Unfortu-
nately, the perceptual divide suggested by Easterbrook re-
sults in the rapid evaporation of meaning from sustainable
development because any project that promotes economic
growth can be viewed as sustainable simply because it results
in short-run employment opportunities, the present value of
which, if a high financial discount rate is used, may over-
whelm long term gains. Under this rationale, sustainability
is in the eye of the beholder. Easterbrook is correct that
water and indoor air pollution in huts of rural Africa are pub-
lic health matters of great concern. Nevertheless, focusing on
those problems does not justify removing the Climate Change
Convention from the agenda of UNCED. On the contrary, as
we will see, the Climate Change Convention will probably be
more powerful in improving indoor and outdoor air quality in
developing countries than all the complaining about funding
priorities ever could be.
In thinking about what sustainable development means,
we should not be myopically focused on whether the water in
a particular location is overly polluted. Instead we should
40. Id. at 63.
41. Id.
To make Rio a fashionably negative event about Western guilt-trip-
ping and America-bashing, the prospect of global warming was put
above the urgent loss of lives in the third world from water and air
pollution. Rio concluded with Western leaders' agreeing to devote
billions of dollars to controlling global warming, while not lifting a
finger for the 7.8 million poor children who die each year mainly
from what they drink and breathe.
Id. at 61.
[Vol. 13
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look at how to create a legal model that will cause routine
financial and business decisions to internalize environmental
and public health consequences. Over time, as our capital is
recycled, new infrastructure investments will reflect low-cost,
efficient avoidance of adverse effects. As an overarching legal
framework that will eventually require efficient use of fossil
fuels and renewable energy, the Climate Change Convention
has the potential to move huge amounts of public and private
investment capital from the north to the south. Decisions
about what, where or whether a new economic development
project is built should be driven by some internalizing process
that harnesses the efficiency of the market without sacrific-
ing environmental quality. The Climate Change Convention
provides a powerful vehicle to reach this end, especially when
combined with the internalizing power of domestic environ-
mental regulation enacted to implement Climate Change
Convention requirements.
But how will the Climate Change Convention fit into this
model of sustainable development? This question can be an-
swered by examining the potential response of electric utili-
ties to America's goal under the Convention. For the United
States to meet its expressed goal of 1990 emission levels by
the year 2000, the electric utilities in the United States will
be required to reduce substantially the amount of carbon di-
oxide they emit when they burn coal and other fossil fuels to
generate electricity. Since the locations of carbon dioxide
emissions within each country are immaterial, as long as
global emissions are reduced, the task of making the reduc-
tions is amenable to market-based mechanisms such as off-
sets and emission allowance trading.
In response to international developments, a number of
states have indicated that they will allow utilities to meet
emission reduction requirements by engaging in offset
projects, such as demand-side management or carbon seques-
tration. Massachusetts has been most explicit in defining the
qualitative parameters for offsets.42 For a greenhouse gas
42. See Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Util., 643 N.E.2d 1029 (Mass. 1994);
FINAL ORDER, INVESTIGATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES ON ITS
13
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offset to apply, it must be a real reduction: durable, measura-
ble, and enforceable. At the national level, in section 1605(b)
of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the U.S. Department of En-
ergy (DOE) was authorized to establish a set of criteria for
measuring whether an entity has engaged in an emissions re-
duction project and for recording on the government's records
the amount, of emissions that were reduced. Under the Act,
no company is required to reduce emissions. Those that vol-
untarily do so, and whose projects meet the DOE criteria, will
have those reductions formally recorded, with the hope that
these certified reductions will be usable in the future to meet
any mandatory reduction requirements or to sell to compa-
nies that need reductions.
Thus, section 1605(b) is creating a preliminary structure
within which a market for greenhouse gas emission reduc-
tions can develop. DOE has issued general and industry spe-
cific guidelines that attempt to define what an emission
reduction really is, particularly in the context of a developing
nation which must increase its energy use simply to provide
for the basic needs of society.43 At about the same time, the
U.S. Department of State issued groundrules for pilot
projects for the joint implementation of the United States' ob-
ligations under the Climate Change Convention.44
The purpose of the State Department pilot program is,
... to encourage the rapid development and implementa-
tion of cooperative, voluntary and cost-effective projects be-
tween domestic and foreign partners aimed at reducing or
sequestering emissions of greenhouse gases, particularly
projects promoting technology in developing countries and
countries in transition to market economies .... Projects
in our domestic pilot program will enable us to test and
OWN MOTION AS TO ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITY VALUES TO BE USED IN RE-
SOURCE COST EFFECTIVENESS TESTS BY ELECTRIC UTILITIES SUBJECT TO THE DE-
PARTMENT'S JURISDICTION, DPU 91-131 (Mass., Nov. 10, 1992).
43. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases under
Section 1605(b) of the Energy Policy Act of 1992: General Guidelines (Public
Review Draft May 31, 1994).
44. Dep't of State, Announcement of Groundrules for U.S. Initiative on
Joint Implementation, Bureau of Oceans and Intl Envtl. and Sci. Affairs 59
Fed. Reg. 28,442 (1994) [hereinafter USIJI Guidelines].
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evaluate methodologies for measuring, tracking and verify-
ing costs and benefits, and, we believe, help establish an
empirical basis to contribute to the formulation of interna-
tional criteria for joint implementation. 45
Under this pilot program, any U.S. person, including pri-
vate and governmental entities, can enter into a U.S. Initia-
tive on Joint Implementation (USIJI) project with any
country, person or entity in a country that has signed, rati-
fied, or acceded to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change.46 To be a USIJI pilot project, the proposal must be
approved by a panel that will insure that the project is ac-
ceptable to the host country. The evaluation involves: "spe-
cific measures to reduce or sequester greenhouse gas
emissions;" provides data and measurement methodology to
establish a baseline of current and future greenhouse gas
emissions in the host country with and without the project;
reduces or sequesters greenhouse gas emissions beyond the
baseline without the project; provides adequate independent
project data verification; identifies non-greenhouse gas envi-
ronmental impacts and benefits; and provides "adequate as-
surance that the greenhouse gas emissions reduced or
sequestered over time will not be lost or reversed."47 Analo-
gous, but not identical, rules have been established by the
DOE in its section 1605(b) guidelines.
Neither section 1605(b) nor the State Department's
USIJI guidelines grant applicants legal emission credits, or
any guarantee that if and when an emission credit or trading
program is established, that section 1605(b) or USIJI reduc-
tions will qualify or receive credit under the Convention or
U.S. law. Moreover, the Convention's Conference of the Par-
ties has not yet agreed on any international rules or guide-
lines for joint implementation under the Climate Change
45. Id. at 28,444. United States Statement on Joint Implementation Before
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Aug. 29, 1994.
46. USIJI Guidelines, supra note 44, at 28,443.
47. Id. at 28,444.
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Convention.48 However, at its meeting in Berlin in April
1995, the Conference of the Parties (COP) did agree to allow
joint implementation arrangements, but no credits would be
assigned during the pilot phase (through the year 2000).4 9
Both the State Department USIJI pilot program and the
DOE's section 1605(b) guidelines, which track domestic and
foreign offset projects, are purely voluntary. Neither grant
nor promise legally enforceable credits. Neither the COP nor
the United States has adopted any enforceable emission
targets or caps. Nevertheless, nearly thirty projects have
been submitted to the State Department for review in its first
round of submissions.50
The anticipation of future emission caps, taxes or limita-
tions, combined with the lure of using market mechanisms to
achieve low cost emission reductions, has generated substan-
48. William K Stevens, Climate Talks Enter Harder Phase of Cutting Back
Emissions, N.Y. TImEs, Apr. 11, 1995, at C4.
49. The NEW YoRK TIMES reported that the U.S. Under Secretary of State
Timothy Wirth characterized the international consensus to start joint imple-
mentation as the meeting's "signature item" even though no credits would be
granted to pilot projects. Id. Presumably, as was the case with the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendment's sulfur dioxide emission trading allowance scheme (42
U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651(o) (1990)), which granted retroactive credits to utilities in
states which had voluntarily invested to reduce their sulfur dioxide emissions
prior to the amendments. 42 U.S.C. § 7651(e) (1990). So too, good faith volun-
tary projects that create real, verifiable, durable greenhouse gas reductions or
sequestrations will be given retroactive credit if and when an international
joint implementation plan under the Convention is adopted. See, e.g., Re: Ad-
vance Plans for Construction of Facilities, 136 P.U.R. 4th 153, 176, 1992 WL
318828 (Wis. P.S.C. 1992) (noting that just as the P.S.C.'s consideration of sul-
fur emissions years before the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments had put Wis-
consin utilities in an advantageous position when the trading allowance
program was adopted, so it would be prudent to similarly anticipate potential
climate change regulations). Obviously, the ability to earn credits under the
Climate Change Convention will provide "a major incentive for the private sec-
tor to engage in economically risky projects in developing countries." Industry
Accuses Administration of Breaking Promise on Berlin Talks, 1995 WL 2265677
(4/19/95 GLWM (Global Warming Network Online) file quoting John Shlaes,
executive director, Global Climate Coalition, an industry lobbying group).
50. Pamela Wexler and David Hodas, 1994 Annual Report, Special Commit-
tee on Global Climate, in NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY AND ENvmoNmENTAL
LAw-1994 YEAR IN REVIEW 168 (1995). The report notes that the proposals span
a range of industrial sectors and regions, including Central and South America,
Asia, Central Europe and Russia.
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tial response. A recently reported domestic example is the
trade between a New York utility and an Arizona utility of
carbon dioxide emission reductions recorded under section
1605(b) for unused sulfur dioxide allowances. The transac-
tion calls for the New York utility to transfer its right to
claim 1.75 million tons of carbon dioxide emission reduc-
tions51 recorded with the DOE under section 1605(b) guide-
lines to the Arizona utility, which plans to expand its coal-
fired electricity generation. In exchange, the Arizona utility
will transfer 25,000 tons of unused Clean Air Act sulfur diox-
ide allowances to the New York utility, which will donate
them to a public interest environmental group. The public
interest group will retire the allowances, thereby reducing
sulfur dioxide emissions by 25,000 tons. The tax deduction
value to the New York utility of the contribution will be used
to institute additional demand-side management measures.5 2
When the transaction was announced, the 25,000 ton sulfur
dioxide allowances, with a market value of approximately
$1.50 per ton, were worth about $3.75 million. Thus, the 1.75
million tons of carbon dioxide reductions recorded under sec-
tion 1605(b) were worth about $2.00 per ton.
Since the COP agreed in Berlin to negotiate by 1997 an
agreement on specific emission reductions after 2000, the
need for low-cost emission reduction and sequestration strat-
egies will soon become critical. Just to cap the world's carbon
dioxide emissions at 1990 levels by 2000, given current in-
creases since 1990 and projected trends, will require the Or-
ganization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries to reduce their emissions and growth in
emissions by about 800 million tons per year.5 3 In addition,
1.5 billion tons per year of reductions or sequestration to ac-
commodate anticipated growth in the developing countries of
51. Peter Passell, For Utilities, New Clean-Air Plan, N.Y. TmEs, Nov. 18,
1994, at D1. These reductions were the product of the utility's energy efficiency
projects in its service area. Id.
52. Id.
53. Stevens, supra note 48, at C4. Data taken from the graphs in the article
"Projecting Carbon Emissions," source: Department of Energy, and "Compar-
ing Emissions," source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, United
Nations.
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the world will be necessary to provide some equitable adjust-
ment in present and historical per capita emissions. 54 Thus,
the OECD nations will need to find about 2.3 billion tons of
reductions or sequestration per year through 2010 just to
maintain emissions at 1990 levels.
However, a 1990 emission level cap will still result in in-
creased carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere.
This is why the COP agreed to negotiate further specific
emission reductions to begin after 2000. For instance, a tar-
get of limiting emissions to 80% of 1990 levels (6 billion tons
per year) after 2000 would require an additional worldwide
reduction or sequestration of 1.2 billion tons per year. To
meet this, or even less ambitious goals, will require an enor-
mous investment in energy efficiency in OECD countries.
Perhaps more importantly, investments in developing coun-
tries in state-of-the-art energy efficiency and renewable en-
ergy technology will also be required so they can achieve
economic growth without increasing fossil fuel use. To
achieve this goal, developing countries should not be allowed
to use our inefficient cast-off technology. Rather we must en-
able these nations to jump directly to the most efficient de-
mand-side and renewable energy technologies.
The need to achieve this goal at low cost is imperative.
Certainly, if voluntary reductions without legal credit signifi-
cance are trading at $2 per ton before any binding caps or
reductions are agreed to or imposed, it is reasonable to expect
that reduction and sequestration credits necessary to meet
mandated emission limits could be as high as $50 per ton,
especially when reductions must be verified, actual, durable
and enforceable.5 5 At $50 per ton for 2 billion tons of reduc-
tion or sequestration per year, the world's investment would
be about $100 billion per year for several decades. This is
equivalent to the estimated capital requirement for electric
power growth over the next two decades.56 It would be tragic
54. Id.
55. See RiCHARD L. OTINGER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF ELECTRIC-
rry 184-85 (1990).
56. Richard L. Ottinger, Energy and Environmental Challenges For Devel-
oped and Developing Countries, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 55, 62-63 (1991).
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if this investment did not maximize a shift to sustainable eco-
nomic growth.5 7
Joint implementation provides a powerful mechanism to
achieve low-cost emission reductions while promoting sus-
tainable development. Some early pilot projects demonstrate
this potential. The oldest is the Applied Energy Service
(AES) forestry project in Guatemala to sequester carbon in
trees and reduce emissions from deforestation to offset the
carbon dioxide emissions from an AES coal-fired electric
power plant to be built in the United States. Although the
project is subject to some criticism, and might not meet the
USIJI criteria for pilot projects,5 8 if successful, it will reduce
atmospheric carbon dioxide by 15.5 million tons at a cost of
less than $2 per ton. More importantly, it has provided criti-
cal field testing for forestry offset projects and has spurred
The capital requirements of electric power growth (projected at 5 to
7.5% per year on a current trends basis) has been estimated to be
$1.4 to $4 trillion over the next two decades. Unfortunately, the
World Bank currently lends less than $4 billion per year to the en-
ergy sector, while commercial lending stands at about $16 billion
per year and has been declining rapidly.
Id.
57. Id. Ottinger provides a vivid example of the tragedy of missed opportu-
nity when precious capital investment is not focused at state-of-the-art
efficiency:
In 1980, China decided to distribute refrigerators throughout the
capital city of Beijing. It did so with resounding success, supplying
refrigerators to over 60% of the Beijing households by 1990, where
only 6% had them in 1980. The reconditioned refrigerators from
Japanese factories were thought to be cheap. They were not cheap
however, when the costs of the electric power supply necessary to
run these very inefficient machines became apparent. In fact, the
purchase and supply of inefficient equipment cost more than three
times what would have been the cost of supplying the most efficient
refrigerators on the world market today.
Id. at 59. Even the limited funds made available in China for energy efficiency
investments (10% of energy investments in 1981 and 1982) resulted in China
saving "an estimated 27 million standard tons of coal per year, which is
equivalent to 6.3% of China's total industrial energy consumption for the year
1985. China's average costs for improving energy efficiency were lower than the
cost of new coal supply and substantially lower than the unsubsidized costs of
new coal supply in other countries."
Id. at 60.
58. OTTINGER, ET AL., supra note 55, at 165-69.
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others to enter this field. 59 Norway is financing a project in
Mexico to install high efficiency light bulbs that will reduce
carbon dioxide emissions at a cost far below the marginal
costs in Norway.60 In Poland, a joint venture between Philips
and the Polish power sector will replace 1.15 million in-
candescent lamps with compact florescent lamps over two
years, saving approximately seventy-three gigawatt-hours
per year of electricity and reducing carbon emissions by about
500,000 tons. This pilot project will also build Poland's de-
mand-side-management capacity and support local non-profit
organizations. 6 1
A portfolio of similar projects, including energy effi-
ciency, transportation improvement, wind power, solar
power, biomass, fuel cell technology, and boiler and manufac-
turing improvements, is being developed and funded by the
Global Environment Facility.62 This will provide .an exten-
sive base to support joint implementation investments. The
range of these innovative investment opportunities is re-
markably broad.63 In fact, there are now U.S. consulting
firms devoted to putting together these kinds of projects by
developing the project concept, locating funding, helping to
negotiate agreements between U.S. companies and foreign
governments and entities, as well as dealing with multilat-
eral banks and national foreign aid agencies. 64
59. See MARK C. TREXLER AND CHRISTINE HAUGEN, KEEPING IT GREEN:
TRoPIcAL FoREsTRY OPPORTUNITIES FOR MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE (Mar.
1995); Sheryl Sturges & Jeffrey B. Hewitt, Progress of a Policy Experiment: Cli-
mate Challenge Interim Report Card, 8 THE ELECTRICITY J. 60 (1995).
60. Robert J. Anderson, Joint Implementation of Climate Change Measures:
An Examination of Some Issues (Jan. 1994); The World Bank, Facing the Global
Environment Challenge: A Progress Report on World Bank Global Environment
Operations, 11 (June - Aug. 1995).
61. The World Bank, Facing the Global Environment Challenge: A Progress
Report on World Bank Global Environment Operations (Jan. - Feb. 1995), 28-29
(1995).
62. The World Bank, Global Environment Coordination Div., Environment
Dep't: Facing the Global Environment Challenge: A Progress Report on World
Bank Environment Operations Work Program App. (Jan. - Feb. 1995).
63. KErrH KOZLOFF AND OLATOKUMBO SHOBOWALE, RETHINKING DEVELOP-
MENT ASSISTANCE FOR RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY (1994).
64. See, e.g., Sheryl D. Sturges, Greenhouse Gas Emission Offsets: A Global
Warming Insurance Policy, 6 THE ELECTRIcrrY J. 70 (1993).
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To the extent an emissions cap is established under the
Climate Change Convention, U.S. utilities and industrial
companies will be motivated to invest in emission reductions
in foreign projects because the costs will inevitably be lower
than in the U.S. The DOE's § 1605(b) guidelines now identify
criteria for most industrial sectors as well as agriculture, con-
struction, commercial and forestry businesses. There is even
exploratory work underway to establish a private investment
fund that will try to assemble and consolidate capital as a
mutual fund that will invest in these types of projects as long
term investments.
This brings us back to the role of the Climate Change
Convention within the context of UNCED and sustainable de-
velopment. According to Easterbrook, indoor air pollution
from dung and charcoal burning in rural African huts should
have been a priority at UNCED, instead of the Climate
Change Convention. Yet, an emissions cap under the Con-
vention would do more to improve indoor air pollution in ru-
ral developing countries than anything that UNCED could
have produced if it had followed Easterbrook's narrow focus.
The emissions cap could motivate investment by U.S. compa-
nies in efficient stoves for rural families now cooking inef-
ficiently and with large amounts of smoke:
A $1 billion annual investment would supply efficient wood
stoves to the 400 million rural households in developing
countries (based on a cost of $10 per stove with a four year
life span). The fuelwood conserved could generate, in bio-
mass fired stoves, as much electricity as eighty [80] large
nuclear power plants costing $160 billion. On a more ad-
vanced level, it has been calculated in Brazil that invest-
ments of $10 billion over the next 15 years in more efficient
refrigerators, street lighting, lighting for commercial build-
ings, motors, industrial motors and variable speed drives
could preclude the construction of 22 gigawatts of new elec-
tric generating capacity at a cost of $44 billion.65
65. Ottinger, supra note 56, at 61.
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If a company were to invest in these stoves and train people
to distribute them, it could, at a low cost per ton, obtain a
credit for emission reductions through the reduced charcoal
used and reduced deforestation from wood gathering, and, as
a side benefit, would dramatically improve the indoor air
quality and the respiratory health of hundreds of millions of
persons. 66
By placing a cap on carbon dioxide emissions, to be
achieved by market-based mechanisms such as joint imple-
mentation linked to emission reduction credit trading, we can
both achieve our climate change prevention goals at the low-
est possible cost and help break the link between economic
cost and environmental improvement. As the world begins to
use its energy more efficiently, capital will be freed to ad-
vance economic development and provide services, such as
clean air, safe drinking water, effective sewage treatment,
and improved education to the developing world. Thus, by
fully implementing the Climate Change Convention, we will
create the market signals to integrate efficient (and therefore
less polluting) use of fossil fuels into routine economic
decisions.
Without the pressure of the Convention's implementa-
tion, UNCED sustainable development concepts will be little
more than a vague set of concepts that could justify any eco-
nomic project as "sustainable" on the grounds that it will pro-
vide some additional jobs, despite possible human health and
environmental harms. The Climate Change Convention is
therefore intimately and necessarily linked to UNCED goals
of sustainable development because it provides the specific
parameters around which the concept of sustainable develop-
ment can have meaning and be concretely implemented.
66. In fiscal 1995, the Global Environment Facility approved a grant in
Mali for a household energy project that will address "both the demand for and
supply of household energy in a country where people depend heavily on envi-
ronmentally damaging wood fuels. Consumption of these fuels will be reduced
by promoting the use of more efficient stoves and by substituting wood fuels
with kerosene and bottled gas .... " The World Bank, Mainstreaming the Envi-
ronment: The World Bank Group and the Environment Since the Rio Earth
Summit, 47 (1995).
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